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FROM CRISIS TO SOLUTION— 
CALIFORNIA’S PROBLEMS IN TWO BOOKS:  
A REVIEW OF REMAKING CALIFORNIA AND 
CALIFORNIA CRACKUP 
John S. Caragozian* 
At least California’s deep failures have created opportunities for 
deep long-term thinking. Two new books, Remaking California and 
California Crackup, are worth reading and pondering for their 
analyses of California’s problems and a look into potential solutions. 
The first, Remaking California, is edited by R. Jeffrey Lustig, a 
professor at California State University, Sacramento, and a former 
director of the university’s Center for California Studies.1 It contains 
chapters from several contributors. Professor Lustig introduces 
Remaking California with a familiar list of some of the events that 
have led to the decline of California’s public sector: Proposition 13, 
which centralized power in Sacramento; three strikes, which—
without the necessary accompanying revenues—skyrocketed prison 
costs; and Proposition 140, which imposed strict term limits and 
gutted the legislature. 2 
He categorizes the results of these and other events into three 
structural problems, all of which need to be addressed. The first 
problem is a crisis of governance, best exemplified by the state’s 
chronic inability to fashion timely or honest budgets. 3 The second is 
a crisis of representation, which includes voter apathy, citizens’ 
disconnection from government, and legislators’ unwillingness to act 
 
 * Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. The author thanks Loyola Law 
School Los Angeles Professor Karl Manheim and Adjunct Professor Donald Warner for their 
substantial contributions to this book review. 
 1. REMAKING CALIFORNIA (R. Jeffrey Lustig ed., 2010). 
 2. See R. Jeffrey Lustig, California at the Edge, in REMAKING CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, 
at 3, 4. 
 3. Id. at 7. 
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for the long-term public good.4 The third is a crisis of social order, 
by which Professor Lustig means the state’s balkanization in 
geography, culture, and class.5 
While Professor Lustig is correct about the need to address these 
three crises, none of them, especially the crises of representation and 
social order, are unique to California. Perhaps, then—and Professor 
Lustig likely would concur—we cannot look just inside California 
for all of the causes of and solutions to these crises. 
Veteran newspaper reporter, editor, and columnist Dan Walters 
(the political columnist for the Sacramento Bee) acknowledges in his 
Remaking California chapter that other states face similar problems 
but opines that they are more severe in California: 6 “California is a 
canary in the civic mine, telling the rest of the nation what can 
happen when its governmental structure loses relevance to its 
socioeconomic reality, and when single-purpose decisions made in 
the political climate of the moment interact with each other and 
create unintended consequences.” 7 
Walters cites Proposition 13 as an example of such a single-
purpose decision.8 Passed by voters in 1978 in response to escalating 
property taxes on homes, Proposition 13 has centralized power in 
Sacramento. 9 Local governments—counties, cities, and school 
districts—have lost their abilities to control their own revenues, 
which, before Proposition 13, consisted mostly of local property 
taxes. 10 Now, they increasingly depend on allocations of state 
revenues. 11 As a result, local governments have become less 
accountable to, and less connected with, their constituents. Although 
Republicans have long championed small local government and 
continue to support Proposition 13, they have seen Proposition 13 
weaken local government. 12 Walters quotes longtime state senator, 
 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. at 7–8. 
 6. Dan Walters, Decline and Fall, in REMAKING CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 23, 24–25. 
 7. Id. at 25. 
 8. See id. at 30. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Lenny Goldberg, Proposition 13: Tarnish on the Golden Dream, in REMAKING 
CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 41, 45. 
 12. Id. at 47. 
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Republican Marian Bergeson, as saying, “The loss of local autonomy 
is one of the most bitter results of Proposition 13.” 13 
Proposition 13 is further explored by tax expert Lenny Goldberg 
in his chapter. 14 Goldberg emphasizes one of the proposition’s 
positive aspects: it accomplished its goal of slashing residential 
property taxes, thereby saving many people from having to sell their 
homes. 15 However, it disproportionately benefited commercial 
property, in that business property is sold less often—and, therefore, 
under Proposition 13 lags more in being reassessed up to the current 
market value—than residential property. 16 
Goldberg also correctly notes that Proposition 13 amended the 
California Constitution to require a two-thirds majority vote in the 
legislature to raise state taxes, but only a simple majority is needed to 
lower them. 17 He acutely observes that this requirement ratchets 
taxes downward. 18 During good economic times, the legislature, by a 
simple majority, can (and perhaps should) lower a tax rate. However, 
when a tax rate must be increased to supply needed additional 
revenues, then a two-thirds vote is required for the increase. This 
asymmetry is worsened with Proposition 140’s term limits: short-
time legislators have “no time to build up enough credibility with 
their constituents to be able to support anything as unpopular as new 
taxes.” 19 
Worst of all, Proposition 13 signaled the decline of California’s 
post–World War II bipartisanship. As exemplified by moderate 
Republican governors Earl Warren and Goodwin Knight and 
moderate Democratic governor Pat Brown, state and local spending 
on schools, roads, parks, and the like was seen as “investing” in 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 41. 
 15. See id. at 42. 
 16. Id. at 44. The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 13 against an equal 
protection claim. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 
P.2d 1281, 1293–94 (Cal. 1978). 
 17. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3. 
 18. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 50–55 (discussing the history of the two-thirds requirement 
and difficulty it creates for raising taxes). 
 19. Id. at 52; see also Mike Zapler, Many Backers of Strict Term Limits Now Regret It, 
Saying They Only Made Things Worse, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 31, 2010, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_15649835?IADID (discussing the effects of term limits on 
passing bills). 
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California’s long-term future. 20 Those investments paid off: 
California attracted people from across the country eager to enroll 
their children in top-notch schools and universities, to drive on well-
maintained roads, and to enjoy beautiful parks, all public and all free 
(or almost free). 21 Businesses were similarly attracted, and California 
boomed. 22 Now, the lexicon has changed: “invest” has been replaced 
by “spend.” Many Californians may still want those services, but not 
at the price of breaking partisan orthodoxy to spend for the 
services. 23 
In his chapter, St. Louis University professor Christopher Witko 
broadens Goldberg’s analysis. Witko indicts constitutional initiatives 
generally, both those mainly supported by Republicans, such as 
Proposition 13, and those mainly supported by Democrats, such as 
Proposition 98 (which, to over-simplify, mandates that the legislature 
allocate 40 percent of the state’s general fund for K–14 education). 24 
Using Propositions 13 and 98 as illustrations, Witko points out that 
both initiatives deprive the legislature of the traditional fundamental 
role of crafting a budget. 25 Such initiatives may have reflected once-
popular causes but remained in force long after their popularity 
waned or circumstances changed. 26 
Initiatives may also be anti-majoritarian. In the traditional 
republican form of government, the legislature’s majority exercises 
control and, therefore, is responsible to the state as a whole. 27 
However, over the years, California voters have passed various 
constitutional initiatives that require super-majorities. 28 California is 
in a small minority of states that require a two-thirds vote to raise 
 
 20. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 43. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 47 (“The problem, as former Republican Finance Director Cliff Allenby put it 
succinctly, is that ‘Californians want high levels of services for their middle level of taxes.’”); 
Cathleen Decker, Poll: Californians Want It Both Ways on Budget, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at 
A1. 
 24. Christopher Witko, The California Legislature and the Decline of Majority Rule, in 
REMAKING CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 60, 66–67. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 68–69 (discussing the previously passed Proposition 140 and its failure to 
deliver on what was promised, a notion supporters now acknowledge). 
 27. See id. at 71–72. 
 28. Joe Mathews, California Ruined by Supermajority, S.F. SENTINEL, May 30, 2010, 
http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=75206. 
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taxes, and until 2010, it was the only state that required two-thirds 
votes both to raise taxes and to pass a budget. 29 Who is accountable 
when no two-thirds vote is obtained? California’s history—in 
particular, the legislature’s failure in sixteen of the past twenty years 
to enact a timely budget—suggests that neither side believes it will 
be held accountable. This lack of accountability destroys an essential 
element of republican government, namely that voters have 
reasonable bases for deciding whom to elect—or to reelect—to 
represent them. 
Some Californians hope that two recent initiatives will allay the 
ill effects of the two-thirds requirements. The first, Proposition 11, 
which passed in 2008, took redistricting of state assembly and senate 
districts away from the legislature and gave it to a nonpartisan 
citizens’ commission. 30 The theory was that, by eliminating the old 
gerrymandered districts (which were drawn to protect incumbents 
and which thereby perpetuated past party divisions), the new districts 
would be more competitive. Competitive districts, in turn, would 
require legislators to appeal to a broader range of voters and would 
result in more moderate legislators being elected. The second, 
Proposition 14, which passed in 2010, created a top-two primary in 
which the two candidates—regardless of party—receiving the 
highest number of primary votes face off in the general election. 31 
Again, the theory was that more moderate legislators would be 
elected. 
Witko is skeptical that either proposition will cure California’s 
problems. He points out that Proposition 11’s nonpartisan 
redistricting is unlikely to result in many competitive districts, 
because partisan voters “are increasingly clumping themselves in 
 
 29. Witko, supra note 24, at 66. Voters’ approval of Proposition 25 in November 2010, 
ended California’s requirement of a two-thirds vote in each house to pass a state budget. Thad 
Kousser, Editorial, Let the Majority Rule, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at A31. 
 30. Witko, supra note 24, at 75. In November 2010, California voters rejected an effort to 
repeal Proposition 11. Editorial, A New Map for California, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at A12. 
Indeed, voters expanded the role of the nonpartisan citizens’ commission by adding congressional 
redistricting to the commission’s duties. Id. 
 31. Anthony York, Proposition 14 Passes, Bringing Open Primaries to California, 
POLITICAL (June 8, 2010, 9:41 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/06/ 
do-not-publish--propositon-14-passes.html. 
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specific geographic areas of the state.” 32 This “clumping” may also 
mute Proposition 14’s effects. 
However, Witko’s analysis here might miss two possibilities. 
First, even if the redrawn districts or top-two primaries result in the 
election of only a handful of new moderates, that handful may be 
enough to alter the balance in the legislature, at least on close 
partisan votes. Second, Proposition 11 may affect California politics, 
even apart from who is actually elected. In particular, Proposition 11 
may increase Californians’ faith in their government by eliminating 
the legislature’s self-dealing (namely, legislators drawing district 
lines to protect their own jobs, at the expense of the public interest in 
coherent districts). 33 
Finally, it is difficult to judge the effects of Propositions 11 and 
14 before either proposition has been implemented. It may take at 
least two or three election cycles to begin to gauge these 
propositions’ effects. 
Lustig then goes beyond election procedure and explains that 
low voter turnout widens the disconnect between Californians and 
their government, in that elected officials tend to respond to the 
relatively few voters and tend not to respond to the greater number of 
non-voters. 34 Much of this problem, though, is national. 35 Indeed, 
California’s 2000 and 2008 voter turnouts (both of which Professor 
Lustig highlights) may have been higher than the national averages 
in those years. 36 
 
 32. Witko, supra note 24, at 75. In addition, a cosponsor of the Rebooting California 
Symposium, the Center For Governmental Studies, pointed out another possible drawback of 
Proposition 11: if California ends up with more competitive legislative districts, then more money 
may be required to fund legislative campaigns, which, in turn, may increase the importance of 
campaign contributors. See Patrick McGreevy, State Begins New Era in Redistricting, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A1 (“Experts at the Center for Government Studies in L.A. have pointed 
out that one unintended effect of the changes is that winning in an election is about to become a 
lot more costly for candidates, because more competitive races take more money. That means, of 
course, candidates will probably have to hit up special interests for more cash.”). 
 33. Jim Sanders, First Members Selected for California Redistricting Panel, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Nov. 19, 2010, at A3 (“‘It’s one step toward making Californians believe in their 
government more than they do now,’ Trudy Schafer, of the League of Women Voters of 
California, said of having residents rather than lawmakers draw boundary lines.”). 
 34. See R. Jeffrey Lustig, Voting, Elections, and the Failure of Representation in California, 
in REMAKING CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 99, 103–06. 
 35. Italy has a 90 percent voting rate; New Zealand has an 88 percent rate. Id. at 103. 
 36. In 2008, “only 60 percent of eligible Californians voted,” id., while the national turnout 
of eligible voters was 61.6 percent (56.9 percent of the voting-age population). 2008 General 
Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html 
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California State University, Long Beach, professor Ronald 
Schmidt points out in his Remaking California chapter that 
California’s low turnout of registered voters is actually worse than 
raw numbers suggest. 37 Specifically, California, with its many non-
citizens and its low voter registration, has relatively few voters. The 
result is that a small number of Californians, disproportionately 
affluent and white, choose the state’s leaders. How can those leaders, 
Schmidt asks, who—like the voters who elected them—are 
“disproportionately old, white, and economically well-off, possibly 
know how to craft policies that meet the needs of the state’s people 
as a whole?” 38 However, this question’s implication—that 
California’s leaders are wealthy whites out of touch with other 
demographic groups—may be incorrect. For example, the assembly 
speaker is second only to the governor in influence in California 
government, and a white person has served as assembly speaker for 
only four of the past thirty years. 39 A foreign-born man (albeit, 
white) served as governor from 2003 to 2010, 40 and a Filipina 
American, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, was nominated and confirmed as the 
 
(last updated Oct. 6, 2010); Historical Voter Registration and Participation in State-Wide 
General Elections 1910–2009, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/ 
historical-voter-reg/hist-voter-reg-and-part-general-elections-1910-2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 
2010) (showing 59.2 percent of eligible California voters voted in 2008). In 2000, the national 
turnout of eligible voters was 54.2 percent (50.0 percent of the voting-age population). 2000 
General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/ 
Turnout_2000G.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL VOTER 
REGISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN STATE-WIDE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1910–2009, available 
at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/historical-voter-reg/hist-voter-reg-and-part-general-
elections-1910-2009.pdf (showing 51.9 percent of eligible voters voted in 2000). Of course, 
Lustig’s fundamental concern is low—and decreasing—voter participation, and this concern may 
be valid regardless of whether California’s turnout is higher or lower than the U.S. average. 
 37. See Ronald Schmidt, Sr., Immigration, Diversity, and the Challenge of Democratic 
Inclusion, in REMAKING CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 121, 125–26 (explaining the exclusion of 
major segments of the California population from voting). 
 38. Id. at 125. 
 39. BILL BOYARSKY, BIG DADDY: JESSE UNRUH AND THE ART OF POWER POLITICS 59–60 
(2008); WINSTON CROUCH & DEAN E. MCHENRY, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION 85 (rev. ed. 1949); see Doris Allen Candidate Biography, JOINCALIFORNIA, 
http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/2368 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010); Bob Hertzberg 
Candidate Biography, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/6033 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2010); Curt Pringle Candidate Biography, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.join 
california.com/candidate/3561 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010); Brian Setencich Candidate Biography, 
JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/4258 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 40. Schwarzenegger’s Inauguration Speech, CNN.COM (Nov. 17, 2003, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/17/arnold.speech/. 
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new Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. 41 Finally, racial 
and ethnic groups are not monolithic. Schmidt gives 1998’s 
Proposition 227, which eliminated bilingual education in 
California, 42 as an example of white voters’ anti-immigrant views. 
Nevertheless pre-election opinion polls showed a majority of Latino 
voters supporting Proposition 227 as well. 43 
Remaking California does venture some solutions, and the major 
ones are well considered. New America Foundation scholars Mark 
Paul and Micah Weinberg propose a 360-seat unicameral legislature, 
with half the seats elected by district (where the elections would be 
traditional winner-take-all) and the other half by region (where the 
elections would be proportional, so as to give some representation to 
minority parties). 44 Paul and Weinberg persuasively argue that 
smaller districts would improve the connection between the people 
and the legislature and that partially eliminating winner-take-all 
elections would elect more moderates. Smaller districts could allow 
third parties, such as Libertarians and Greens, to gain seats in the 
legislature. Paul and Weinberg also posit that a legislature so elected 
would be less susceptible to moneyed and other special interests and 
otherwise would function better than the current legislature does. 45 
What Remaking California does not address is whether such a 
proposal has a chance of being seriously considered, much less 
implemented. The proposal would require a change to the state 
constitution. 46 Would the change be a “revision” or an 
 
 41. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 2, 2010, GENERAL ELECTION 
16 (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf; 
Schwarzenegger Introduces Chief Justice Nominee Tani Cantil-Sakauye, NEWS10 (July 22, 
2010), http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=87567. 
 42. Schmidt, supra note 37, at 129. 
 43. E.g., Cathleen Decker, Bilingual Education Ban Widely Supported, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
1998, at Al. However, post-election polls indicate that Latinos actually voted against Proposition 
227, by a 63-to-37 margin. L.A. TIMES, STUDY #413/EXIT POLL: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY 
ELECTION 5 (1998), available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/CMMR/227/ 
Times227exitpoll.pdf. Even if the post-election poll is correct, that 37 percent of Latino voters 
favored Proposition 227 suggests that Latinos are not a monolithic bloc. 
 44. Mark Paul & Micah Weinberg, Remapping the California Electorate, in REMAKING 
CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 175, 177–78. 
 45. Id. at 187–88; Allen Ides, Approximating Democracy: A Proposal for Proportional 
Representation in the California Legislature, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 451–53 (2011) (reaching 
a similar conclusion about the need for proportional representation). 
 46. Paul & Weinberg, supra note 44, at 190. 
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“amendment”? 47 This revision-versus-amendment question would 
have to be litigated in the courts. If the courts held the proposal to be 
a revison, then the proposal would require a two-thirds vote both 
from the state assembly and from the state senate before it could 
appear on the ballot for voter approval. Since two-thirds votes do not 
appear to be forthcoming from the legislature, especially for a radical 
overhaul of the legislature itself, no such revision could be approved. 
If the proposed remaking of the legislature were held to be an 
amendment, uncertain as that holding is, then the proposal could 
appear on the ballot for voters’ approval without a legislative vote. 
However, even as an amendment, the proposal would face enormous 
obstacles. First, the proposal’s supporters would have to draft and 
submit the amendment to the attorney general. 48 After the attorney 
general gave the proposal a caption and summary, the supporters 
would have to gather valid signatures (in 2011, such a petition would 
require approximately 807,615); 49 with professional signature 
gatherers charging $3 to $5 per signature 50 and the need for extra 
signatures (to provide a margin against invalid signatures), $2.5 
million would likely be the minimum that supporters would need to 
qualify the amendment for the ballot. 51 The election campaign would 
require additional millions of dollars, as would the revision-versus-
amendment litigation. Even if such sums were raised, the 
unicameral-legislature–proportional-voting proposal may not pass 
because voters may find it unfamiliar and more complex than the 
current system. 
 
 47. See id.; Steven Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions 
(Without Answers) Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through 
a Constitutional Convention, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 547, 562–65 (2011) (comparing a 
constitutional revision and a constitutional amendment). 
 48. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(d). 
 49. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEWIDE BALLOT INITIATIVE GUIDE (2010), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-guide-010611.pdf; see CAL. 
CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
 50. See Richard Winton & Jessica Garrison, Caruso Offers to Finance Drive for Sales-Tax 
Hike, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at B1 (discussing the typical cost of a signature as ranging from 
$1.50 to $3); Ben van der Meer, ’Tis the Season for Signature-Gatherers, MODESTO BEE 
(Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.modbee.com/2007/12/17/154626/tis-the-season-for-signature-
gatherers.html (discussing the range of prices per signature varying from as low as 50 cents “to 
$9 or $10 if organizers are running into a deadline to qualify the initiative”). 
 51. See Joe Mathews, Editorial, No Ink—But a Big Deal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at A35. 
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Lustig’s own chapter focuses on the process of constitutional 
reform and suggests a constitutional convention. 52 It is difficult to 
speculate what good or bad might emanate from a convention, 
though, in that the most basic parameters of a convention (e.g., when 
a convention would occur, how delegates would be selected, what 
subjects would be mandated for or prohibited from the convention’s 
consideration, and so forth) are entirely unknown. Indeed, no 
convention of any type is in the offing. Lustig mentions that the 
influential Bay Area Council (BAC) supported a convention in 
2009, 53 but, as Steven Miller chronicles in his article “Getting to a 
Citizens’ Constitutional Convention” in this symposium, the BAC 
eventually withdrew financial support for the proposed initiatives 
that would have provided for a convention. 54 No other major 
supporters or calls for a convention appear on the horizon. 
While the formation of a convention may be speculative, 
Remaking California provides helpful analysis of the BAC-
sponsored convention proposal. One element of the BAC’s proposal 
was that approximately half of the convention delegates would be 
randomly selected. 55 The BAC proposed random selection to avoid 
replicating Sacramento’s gridlock and to foster outside-the-box 
thinking, but Lustig correctly observes that a republican 
government’s foundation is that people elect their own 
representatives. 56 Simply put, voters should be trusted, and random 
selection of delegates betrays a distrust of voters. In addition, as 
Witko opines in his Remaking California chapter, term limits have 
been a disaster for California government by depriving it of 
experienced leadership. 57 Random selection of convention delegates 
would seem to be term limits taken to the nth degree: legislators 
elected after Proposition 140 are allowed only limited experience, 
but randomly selected convention delegates would have no 
experience. Do we want such delegates to create California’s long-
term governmental structure? 
 
 52. R. Jeffrey Lustig, A People’s Convention for California, in REMAKING CALIFORNIA, 
supra note 1, at 192, 201. 
 53. Id. at 197. 
 54. See Miller, supra note 47, at 569. 
 55. See Lustig, supra note 52, at 202. 
 56. Id. at 203. 
 57. Witko, supra note 24, at 68–69. 
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Finally, the details of these proposed reforms—along with some 
of the additional, brief ideas in Remaking California’s epilogue—are 
less important than the need to begin building a consensus about 
basic big-picture objectives. As the book correctly indicates, 
California’s problems have been decades in the making, and the 
remaking process must begin promptly because it, too, will take 
decades. 58 
The second book, California Crackup, is written by Joe 
Mathews and Mark Paul, both with the New America Foundation. 59 
Mathews and Paul provide a persuasive—and depressing—list 
of California’s problems, and then add, “The worst thing about 
California’s fix is that, under the state’s current system of 
government, these problems can’t be fixed.” 60 Other states have 
faced problems similar to California’s—from budget shortfalls to 
electoral polarization—but have not suffered California’s paralysis. 
Like Remaking California, California Crackup focuses much of 
its attention on Proposition 13, using it as a centerpiece of how 
California government has failed. Proposition 13’s history includes 
years of missteps. In the 1960s and 1970s, county assessors, who are 
elected in California, 61 had tried to respond to their constituents by 
keeping assessments—and, therefore, property taxes—low on 
residential property. 62 However, legislators and local officials pushed 
assessors in the opposite direction, encouraging them to raise 
assessments—thereby raising property taxes—in order to pay for 
high-quality public schools and other services that Californians 
wanted. 63 By the 1970s, Californians were feeling a substantial tax 
bite. 64 In connection with income taxes, inflation had pushed middle-
class families into higher tax brackets (often termed “bracket creep”), 
with the result that income taxes increased, even while real incomes 
stayed flat. 65 In connection with property taxes, the appreciation of 
 
 58. See Lustig, supra note 2, at 4–5, 21–22. 
 59. JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP (2010). Paul also coauthored a 
chapter in Remaking California. Paul & Weinberg, supra note 44. 
 60. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 7. 
 61. Id. at 37. 
 62. Id. at 37–38. 
 63. Id. at 37. 
 64. Id. at 38. 
 65. Id. at 41. 
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residential housing values had resulted in higher tax bills on people’s 
homes; however, because homes are illiquid the higher value of the 
homes typically created no cash flow from which to pay the 
increased taxes. 66 
The legislature—and some local governments—failed to 
appreciate the depth of homeowners’ concerns and failed to offer 
meaningful relief. 67 This failure became critical when the state 
government amassed a $7.1 billion surplus and failed to rebate any of 
it. 68 Voters’ anger overflowed, and Proposition 13 passed in 1978 
with an overwhelming 64.8 percent majority vote. 69 
Proposition 13, according to Mathews and Paul, has given us 
bad government. Its requirement of a two-thirds vote in the state 
assembly and state senate to raise revenues and to approve budgets 
has undermined the power of the legislature. 70 With any two-thirds 
vote difficult or impossible to obtain, the public has made 
fundamental budget decisions via initiative rather than by the 
legislature. 71 Unfortunate examples of this shift abound. The 1979 
Gann Initiative created a complex formula for limiting state- and 
local-government spending. 72 Propositions passed in 1988 and 1998 
exempted tobacco taxes from the Gann Initiative and mandated ways 
in which the legislature could spend taxes. 73 Proposition 98, passed 
in 1988, created a complex formula for K–14 education spending. 74 
California Crackup adduces an interesting indication of the 
legislature’s marginalization here: 1996 was the first year in which 
more money was spent on initiative campaigns than on all of that 
year’s legislative races combined. 75 
The result has been government by initiative, supported by an 
industry of initiative writers, signature gatherers, campaign 
 
 66. Id. at 38. 
 67. Id. at 40–43. 
 68. Id. at 41. 
 69. Id. at 43–44; Byron Williams, Aspects of Proposition 13 Simply Must Be Reformed to 
Save California, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/byron-
williams/aspects-of-proposition-13_b_240239.html. 
 70. MATTHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 60. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 64. 
 73. Id. at 65. 
 74. Id. at 65–67. 
 75. Id. at 68. 
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consultants, and the like. An ugly example here is the state lottery. A 
signature-gathering firm drafted an initiative to create a state lottery 
and then found a business to fund the initiative. 76 The initiative 
passed, and the signature gathering-firm prospered (to the tune of $2 
million for the signatures and campaign), and the business prospered 
even more (by running the lottery). 77 The lottery was less beneficial 
to the state. The lottery has contributed less than 2 percent of the 
state’s K–12 education budget but is effectively marketed as pro-
education. 78 Ironically, that the lottery was an initiative has turned 
out to be its downfall, because now the legislature is powerless to 
improve the lottery’s old, pre-Internet provisions in a rapidly 
changing world. 79 
All of these and more initiatives have so tied the legislature’s 
hands that it becomes difficult to reconcile the overlay of initiatives’ 
budget requirements with the legislature’s own fiscal process. With 
the two-thirds requirement and rapidly changing economic 
circumstances, “difficult” becomes “impossible.” The result has been 
late budgets laden with one-time gimmicks, overly optimistic 
projections, and hidden borrowing. These devices make each 
subsequent budget that much harder to produce than the one before 
it. We seem to be in a never-ending downward spiral of budgets that 
have been simultaneously draconian and phony, and they have been 
all part of a secret process that only Franz Kafka could appreciate. 
If state government has fared ill under Proposition 13 and its 
progeny, local governments have fared worse. Mathews and Paul 
explain how local governments, increasingly dependent upon state 
dollars, have seen their authority usurped by the state with strings 
attached to those state dollars. 80 With local governments having less 
influence, fewer capable people are running for office on city 
councils, school boards, and the like. As a result, local governments’ 
management weakens, and the local governments’ quality declines, 
making them even less influential. 
 
 76. Id. at 62. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 63. 
 79. Id. Initiatives, even those that merely enact statutes rather than amend the state 
constitution, cannot be amended without another vote of the people, unless the initiative’s own 
language allows legislative amendments. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). 
 80. MATTHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 50–51. 
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In sum, California Crackup, like Remaking California, is critical 
of the various two-thirds requirements that initiatives impose. The 
tyranny of the majority has been replaced by an even worse tyranny 
of the minority. 
Nor are the requirements of the two-thirds majorities the only ill 
effect of initiatives. Many Californians know that Proposition 140, 
passed in 1990, established the nation’s strictest term limits. 81 Fewer 
Californians know that Proposition 140 also mandated a reduction in 
spending on the legislature’s own operations. 82 To cope with this 
reduction, legislators have maintained their large personal staffs but 
reduced the size of the well-regarded non-partisan Legislative 
Analyst’s Office and closed the Assembly Office of Research. 83 
With nature abhorring a vacuum, special interests have moved 
into Sacramento. For example, public employee unions successfully 
lobbied for high salaries and unsustainable pensions for their 
members. Such lobbying may have been facilitated by one-stop 
shopping at a legislature weakened by a lack of strong leadership and 
a lack of expert staff. 84 More generally, Proposition 13 and the Gann 
Initiative may not have decreased government spending. In fact, 
spending may be easier because of a lack of accountability. 
Finally, Proposition 13 has directly created some bad public 
policy for California’s citizens. Poor people tend to rely on the public 
sector: schools, health care, libraries, transportation, and so on. 85 
With the public sector’s decline, California Crackup points out that 
the gap between rich and poor has increased. 86 Schools have been 
particularly affected: the combination of the Serrano v. Priest 
decisions 87 (which equalized per-pupil spending) and Proposition 13 
has been “more about leveling [schools] down than raising [them] 
 
 81. See id. at 73. 
 82. See id. at 74. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See CAL. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, REFORMING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND 
PENSIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.californiacenterforpublicpolicy.com/Reforming-
Public-Employee-Compensation-Pensions.pdf (“The $2 to $5 million in annuity value that 
[public safety] employees may receive through pension programs in their early to middle fifties 
makes these employees’ comprehensive career compensation among the highest in America.”). 
 85. The other half of this equation—namely, a trend of the rich opting out of the public 
sector—is well introduced from a nationwide perspective in Robert B. Reich, Secession of the 
Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, at SM16. 
 86. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 45. 
 87. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
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up.” 88 Certainly, the decades-long decline of California’s public 
elementary and secondary schools is evidence of the leveling down. 
The demonization of Proposition 13, though, must be kept in 
perspective. Proposition 13’s supporters, led by the Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Association, have counterarguments, 89 to which 
California Crackup may have given short shrift. More importantly, 
Proposition 13 remains popular with California voters. 90 
Accordingly, reformers trying to fix California will need to live with 
the reality of Proposition 13, at least in the near term. 
Mathews and Paul begin their discussion of solutions with the 
observation that California needs both political reform (a better-
structured government) 91 and budget reform (honest accounting and 
spending) 92 and is unlikely to get one without the other. 93 Within this 
framework, they propose ideas that are similar to those in Remaking 
California, including the same proposal of a unicameral legislature 
with proportional representation. 94 They also share Remaking 
California’s skepticism that nonpartisan redistricting or top-two 
primaries will effect major change. 95 
Offering broader solutions is further complicated because 
politics in the future may be different than politics are now. Social 
media—such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—have already 
changed fundamentals of everyday communication, just as e-mail, 
the Internet, cell phones, and Blackberries fundamentally changed 
communication in the 1990s and 2000s. President Barack Obama’s 
success in the 2008 primaries showed how voters could be energized 
and organized via social media, even by a poorly funded campaign 
 
 88. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 51. 
 89. See, e.g., Proposition 13, HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.hjta.org/propositions/proposition-13 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
 90. See, e.g., Evan Halper, Voters Skeptical of State Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at 
A7. Not only do most voters continue to support Proposition 13 generally, they oppose even such 
modest tinkering as removal of commercial property from some of Proposition 13’s protections. 
Id. Moreover, in November 2010, voters approved Proposition 26 that expanded Proposition 13’s 
reach by classifying certain fees as taxes, thereby requiring a two-thirds vote to raise such fees. 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 41, at 6. 
 91. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 126–50. 
 92. Id. at 105–26. 
 93. Id. at 79–104. 
 94. Id. at 127–34, 136–38. 
 95. Id. at 117–19, 122. 
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that initially was a long shot. 96 The 2010 Tea Party movement 
showed how social media could be used to build an influential 
political movement, even without a central, top-down organization. 97 
While Mathews and Paul do not dwell on these issues, solutions to 
California’s problems should account for how social media may 
change politics. 98 
Mathews and Paul do propose two important and basic changes 
to California’s government. First, they want to reverse much of the 
centralization of power in Sacramento and give local governments 
authority to deal with local problems. 99 As an example, they point to 
crime. The state has spent billions building, staffing, and operating 
prisons, but experts question whether such spending has been 
effective. Mathews and Paul suggest moving anti-crime programs to 
the local level, where counties and cities could tailor priorities of 
police, probation, substance abuse programs, prisons, and so forth to 
fit local conditions. 100 
As a corollary, the authors suggest reducing the number of 
various special districts (flood control, mosquito abatement, and so 
forth) and transferring those districts’ budgets and operational 
responsibilities to counties and cities. 101 This transfer would improve 
accountability and, perhaps, reduce waste and corruption. 
The second fundamental change Matthews and Paul propose is 
putting some controls on the initiative process, which is responsible 
for much of the current mess. The proposed controls include: 
(a) mandating that the professional governmental staff draft 
initiatives, so as to reduce incomprehensible, self-contradictory, or 
 
 96. David Carr, How Obama Tapped Into Social Networks’ Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2008, at B1. 
 97. See, e.g., Judson Berger, Modern-Day Tea Parties Give Taxpayers Chance to Scream for 
Better Representation, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/09/ 
modern-day-tea-parties-taxpayers-chance-scream-better-representation. 
 98. One possibility, related to social media, is having initiative petitions signed 
electronically rather than using traditional paper petitions signed by hand. A trial court judge 
recently ruled that a “virtual petition” containing electronic signatures is invalid under California 
law. Ni v. Slocum, No. Civ. 492074 (Cal. Super. Ct. order filed Apr. 5, 2010); see CAL. ELEC. 
CODE §§ 100, 9009, 9012 (West 2010). However, an appeal or political debate may serve to keep 
alive this possible method of making the initiative process accessible to proponents who lack the 
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initiatives. 
 99. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 157–58. 
 100. Id. at 158–60. 
 101. Id. at 160–63. 
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other improper drafting; 102 (b) allowing the legislature to amend 
voter-approved statutory initiatives, just as other statutes may be 
amended; 103 (c) requiring approval of constitutional initiatives in two 
different election cycles 104 or, alternatively, approval by two-thirds 
of the voters in a single election; 105 (d) requiring approval of an 
initiative by a super-majority of voters if the initiative’s provisions 
themselves imposed a super-majority; 106 (e) requiring that initiatives 
have funding sources (or, in the case of bonds, repayment 
sources), 107 and (f) allowing the legislature, by majority vote, to 
place a counterproposal next to a voter-sponsored initiative on the 
same ballot, and allowing voters to choose one or neither. 108 
Do any of California Crackup’s or Remaking California’s 
proposals have a realistic chance of adoption? Might, possibly, some 
optimism be warranted? For example, could Californians’ current, 
overwhelming unhappiness with the state’s direction 109 evolve into 
support for fundamental reforms that formerly would have been 
unsupported? The answers to these questions are unknown. What is 
known is that Californians should not allow the state to continue to 
decline. In other words, if no consensus promptly develops in favor 
of the two books’ proposed reforms, then Californians will have to 
adopt other reforms or face worsening crises. 
In the past, California has thrived because of its tremendous 
natural resources: gold, fertile land, manageable water, temperate 
climate, timber, fisheries, oil, harbors, and scenic beauty. Born with 
 
 102. Id. at 175. 
 103. Id. at 176. 
 104. Id. California’s original 1849 constitution had a somewhat similar requirement: article X, 
section 1 specified that any constitutional amendment had to be approved by a majority of each 
house of two successive legislatures before being submitted to voters. CAL. CONST. of 1849, 
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2009). 
 105. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 176. 
 106. Id. at 177. 
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direction.” FIELD RESEARCH CORP., TABULATIONS FROM A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA VOTERS 
ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE, 
THE DIRECTION OF THE STATE, AND WHO’S MOST TO BLAME FOR DELAYS IN PASSING A 
BUDGET (2010), available at http://media.sacbee.com/smedia/2010/09/27/16/ 
0928tabs.source.prod_affiliate.4.pdf. 
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these advantages, California, Mathews and Paul write, has been a 
great state but rarely has had “great government.” 110 As some of 
California’s resources wane and as other states and countries begin to 
develop their own resources, California’s natural advantages may 
decline in importance, and, accordingly, the lack of great government 
may become an even larger detriment. 
Nowadays, residents and businesses alike are able to take 
advantage of modern transportation and communications to locate, or 
relocate, in other states and other countries. If an ineffective 
government makes the state unattractive to residents and businesses, 
then California’s future will be bleak. 
It is a measure of the depth and urgency of California’s 
difficulties that these two earnest and thoughtful efforts, California 
Crackup and Remaking California, were published at almost the 
same time, and just before a seminal state election occurred. Both 
books will alarm and reward the reader. 
 
 110. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 59, at 18. 
